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I. INTRODUCTION
This report presents tbe results of a study of the effects of
bursting of helium pressure bottles in the Apollo Service Module (S/M)
while the spacecraft is undergoing vibration or acoustic testing at the
Manned Spacecraft Center of NASA. The work was conducted by per-
sonnel of the Department of Mechanical Sciences at SwRI, in accordance
with requirements of Contract No. NAS9-7749 from NASA-MSC.
The problem which we are stud_,ing here is well described in the
Statement of Work for the Contract, included as an appendix. Two
40.2-in. diameter titanium alloy pressure spheres located in the Apollo
Service Module (S/M) are considered to be potential explosion hazards
during vibration and acoustic tests to be conducted in the Vibration and
Acoustic Test Facility (VATF). We were to assess the damage potential
of these vessels to the Spacecraft Vibration Laboratory (SVL), the Space-
craft Acoustic Laboratory (SAL), and to adjacent areas; to determine the
maximum pressures which can be tolerated in the vessels consistent with
present facility design criteria; and to suggest methods for modifying or
safeguarding the facilities to minimize damage to structures and operating
pers onne 1.
The SVL is a 60 X 60 X 100-ft laboratory with the spacecraft
mounted vertically in the center. The pressure spheres in the S/M are
located about 55 ft from the floor. The primary framework of the labora-
tory building is of structural steel. A number of balcony-type steel work
platforms surround the spacecraft at various levels. The building walls
are composed of 6-in. thick, precast, exposed aggregate, reinforced
concrete panels (PEAF panels) which are attached to the steel framework
with 3/4-in. diameter steel bolts inserted into tee-slots in the panels.
The PEAF paneis are not load bearing, and they are designed only ior
wind loads. These panels cover the complete west and south sides of the
SVL, the upper part of the north side above a 40-ft high door, and the
upper part of the east wall above the control room roof level at 30 ft.
The door is in three sections and slides horizontally on rails. The
wall of the control room facing into the SVL is made of ceramic tile
blocks, and contains a double glass viewing window and a heavy double
steel door.
The design of the SAL is quite similar to the SVL, and the space-
craft is similarly located. Primary differences are that the wall panels
are 8 in. thick and that the spacecraft is surrounded by a steel shroud
during a test.
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II. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF PROBABLE EFFECTS
OF PRESSURE VESSEL FAILURE
We are not primarily concerned with the probability that failure of
apressure vessel will occur, but, instead, postulate that a failure does
occur and are then concerned with the effects of the failure. On rupture of
one vessel, the sudden release of the stored energy in the compressed
gas will generate an explosion within the S/M which will be intense
enough to rupture the adjacent vessel. Because of the near certainty of
failure of the second vessel after rupture of the first, the energy source
for estimating blast effects must be assumed to consist of both vessels
rather than one. Ablast wave will then emanate from a point which we
can assume to be located midway between the two vessels, andwill
impinge on various internal components of the S/M, on its external skin,
and on the aft heatshield of the Command Module (C/M). The S/N[ itself
will be completely demolished and converted into missiles of indeter-
minate size which will be projected out into the laboratory*. The
C/M will be projected upward, probably at rather low velocity, and will
then fall into the laboratory. It is also quite likely that the aft heatshield
of the C/Mwould be ruptured. If the explosion occurred within the space-
craft while under test in the SAL, some of the blast energywould be
absorbed in acceleration of part of the steel shroud around the spacecraft,
also converting it to missiles. In either laboratory, some of the missiles
could conceivably penetrate or perforate outside walls, doors, and the
walls to the control room.
Only a relatively small amount of the blast energy will be absorbed
in converting hardware to missiles, so that a strong shock wave willpro-
pagate through the laboratory and load the wails, roof, etc. This shock
will be moving much faster than the missiles and will therefore precede
them. The strength of the shock attenuates rapidly with distance from
the source but still may be strong enough to seriously damage wall panels,
doors, windows in the control room, etc. Before striking walls, etc.,
the shock wave must diffract around platforms, beams, etc. in many cases
and may be modified enough that prediction of the actual time history of
wall loading is nearly impossible to predict. An upper limit to the loading
can be obtained, however, by ignoring the presence of internal structural
elements and considering interaction of an unimpeded blast wave with the
wall.
If the wall panels or doors fail, then the panels, or doors, or
parts of them could be projected outward from the building, constituting
':"Empirical data on effects of internal explosiot_s i,_ aircraft show that
1 lb of TNT detonated within the fuselage of any known aircraft will com-
pletely demolish the fuselage.
Z
a missile hazard near the building. Conceivably, a PEAF panel located
above the control room roof could fall on the roof and penetrate into the
control room. The double glass viewing window between the SVL arid the
control room will almost certair_ly be blown into the control room, and
the ceramic tile wall there may also fail. Even though PEAF panels and
doors may be projected outward, they will move much more slowly than
spacecraft fragments and, therefore, will be impacted by these fragments
before moving an appreciable distance.
In short, it appears that from a qualitative sense, a very severe
explosion }lazard does exist. In the following sections of this report, we
will make such quantitative estimates as are possible.
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III. ESTIMATES OF BLAST ENERGY
When a pressure vessel containing compressed gas bursts, the
stored energy in the gas drives a compression wave into the surrounding
atmosphere which rapidly "shocks up" to forma blast wave very similar
to that generated by a conventional explosive charge. Close to the com-
pressed gas sphere source, the overpressures will be somewhat lower
and the durations somewhat longer than for the explosive source, but, at
greater distances, blast waves for sources of equal energy will be identi-
cal. The primary problemin estimating blast effects for the bursting
pressure spheres is then the problem of determining the "TNT equiva-
lent" Once this is known, blast wave parameters can be estimated at
almost any distance from the energy source by using compiled blast data
for TNT.
A very good estimate of the upper limit of TNIT equivalent for any
vessel filled with a compressed gas can be made by assuming that the gas
expands isentropically from the initial pressure and specific volume at
bursting to a final pressure equal to the atmospheric pressure, and com-
puting the change in internal energy of the gas in such an expansion (see
Refs. 1 and 2). The energy change in such aprocess is
1
- -y - 1 " PlV i - P2V2 (1))
where y is the ratio of specific heats for the gas in the vessel, Pl is
initial absolute pressure, V 1 is totalvesselvolume, P2 is atmospheric
pressure, and V 2 is total volume after expansion to atmospheric pres-
sure. The isentropic expansion dictates that
PlV1 _ = PzV_ (Z)
Combined with Eq. (1}, this gives for the blast equivalent energy
p2v pip (3)
The heat of explosion for TNT is about 1800 Btu/lb, or 1.4 X 106 ft-
lb. This energy value divided into the above equation for E yields the blast
equivalent in pounds of TNT.
Let us emphasize that the estimate obtained in this manner is an
upper limit because a reversible and loss-free thermodynamic process
has been assumed. In spite of this, it is undoubtedly reasonably accurate
@and does not overestimate by much. Note that a higher estimate would
have been obtained if onlythe initial internal energy, representea by the
first term in Eq. (1), were used. Note also that the expansion of the
gas, if the pressure vessel is originally at ambient temperature, involves
considerable cooling.
An equation for computation of TNT equivalent, and a table of
energy equivalents per cubic foot of tank volume for various tank pres-
sures, is given for bursting pressure vessels in Refererlce 3. We
believe that this equation is incorrect and yields much too high estimates
of blast energy. It cannot he derived in any rational manner, and it
involves superfluous parameters. A brief comparison of energy equiva-
lents from the table in Reference 3 and those calculated from Eq. (3),
assuming compressed air, is given in Table I. Note that the estimates
TABLE 1.
Tank Pressure,
psig
COMPARISON OF TNT ENERGY EQUIVALENTS
PER CUBIC FOOT OF VOLUME
Energy Equivalent, Ib of TNT
AFM 127-200 Eq. (3)
I0 0.001238 0.000876
1,000 0.4150 0.180
30,000 22.53 6.85
from Reference 3 are consistently too high. We will use Eq. (3) through-
out this study.
As noted earlier, vce will assume that both pressure spheres in the
S/M fail nearly simultaneously. Energy equivalent is then obtained for
100, 75, 50 and 75 percent of full pressurization of 3650 psig and for
laboratory line pressure of 180 psig. Gas in the spheres will be assumed
to be nitrogen with 7 = 7/5. Initial volume is
V 1 = g ×4=r 3 = Z )< 4 × ZO. 13 = 6.80 × 104 in 3
3 3
Final pressure PZ = 14.7 psia, and initial pressure Pl is 3665, Z755,
1840, and 9Z8 psia. Energies from Eq. (3) are then given in Table Z.
TABLE 2. ENERGY EQUIVALENT FOR
BURSTING SPHERES
% of Full E
Pressure ib of TNT
I00 29.26
75 21.50
50 13.84
Z5 6.40
4.9 (line pressure) 1.03
In the SAL, some of the blast energy is converted into kinetic
energy of the shroud, reducing the energy which drives a shock wave
into the laboratory. For each of the initial explosive energies, an
estimate can be made of the velocity with which shroud segments are
projected (see next section of the repert) and the mass of all segments
is known. Kinetic energy, therefore, can be easily calculated as
1 My z (4)E k = _-
NOW,
0. 283M = 156 XTrX 13.0 X I--_-27_
4 386
ib sec g
= 14.00
in,
For the velocities shown in Table 7, the kinetic energies, Ek, and reduced
total energies, E', available for blast loading of walls are given in Table 3.
By comparison of E and E' (Tables 2 and 3), one can see that the decrease
in energy available for blast due to accelerating shroud segments is
almost negligible, particularly when one realizes that blast parameters
are a fupctiop of the cube root of this energy.
TABLE 3. ENERGIES E' FOR BLAST LOADING OF SAL
% of Ek,
1Full Pressure _b of TNT lb of TNT
I00 0. 955 28.30
75 0.610 20.89
50 0,282 [3.66
25 0. 102 6.30
IV. BLAST LOADING
The blast wave generated by vessel rupture impinges on the inner
parts of the S/M, diffracts around them, and then loads the S/M outer
skin. It also impinges on the aft heatshield of the C/M. After disruption
of the S/M structure, the wave then loads the PEAF panel walls and doors
in both laboratories. For tests in the SAL, the wave loads and disrupts
the shroud surrounding the spacecraft before loading laboratory walls
and doors. Before predicting response of these various portions of
structure, etc., we must estimate the blast loading.
A. Wall Loading
The geometry shown in Figure I indicates loading on part of the
wall at the same level as the explosion sources in the S/M. The PEAF
panel in the center of the wall is shown since it is the most heavily loaded.
Explosion
Source 30.3
FIG URE I.
30 ft
J
I
I
w
I
GEOMETRY OF BLAST SOURCE AND PEAF PANEL
The shock front will arrive first at the center of the panel, with
curvature as shown in the sketch. But, arrival at all other parts of the
panelwill occur such a short time later that differences in time-of-arrival
can be neglected. Also, differences in blast wave amplitude and duration
will be small, because the difference in distance from the source to the
nearest and furthest points on the panel is small (30.0 ft to 33.8 ft).
Accordingly, the wall loading will be approximated by a pressure pulse
striking the panel surface normally of the form':-"
p(t) -- P e -t/T
r (5)
where the amp\itude Pr is peak reflected everpressure obtained from a
source of compiled blast data, and the "durations" T, is adjusted so that
the blast wave has a reflected impulse, Ir, which also agrees with
experimentaI data. This is done by setting
T = Ir/P r (6)
The amplitude and duration will be obtained for a mean distance of the
explosion source from the panel, say 32 ft. Values of Pr, Ir, and T are
given in Table 4 for explosive sources equivalent to 100, 75, 50, 25, and
4.9 percent pressure in the vessels. Blast data are from Reference 4.].
TABLE 4. BLAST LOADING OF WALL
E, El/3 3' R/E1/3' Ir/El/3 P , I r, T,
lb of TNT lb 1/ ft/lbl/3 Psi-ms/lb i/3 psri psi-ms ms
29.26 3.08 10.40 12.82 16.56 39.5 2.38
21.50 2.78 11.50 11.49 13.52 31.9 2.36
13.84 2.40 13.33 9.78 10.18 23.4 2.30
6.40 1.857 17.23 7.44 6.62 13.8 2.09
1.03 1.029 31.1 3.90 2.72 4.01 1.475
no Loading of S/M Skin and Acoustic Shroud
The S/M skin consists of light honeycomb in the form of a cylinder
13 ft in diameter, and, for tests in the SAL, it is surrounded by a concen-
tric steel shroud with relatively small clearance. The blast source will
load the S /M skin, cause it to fail, and, for tests in the SAL, then load
the steel shroud. For this loading, the important parameter is the reflected
impulse, I r, which can be determined from Reference 4 for R = 6.5 ft.
Loading is essentially the same for skin and shroud, as given in Table 5.
':"A triangular pulse is also a good approximation, but response calculations
are simpler with the exponential form.
]'Data from namer.us other sources could be used. However, caution should
be exercised since some sources, such as EM 1110-345-413 entitled
"Design of Structures to Resist the Effects of Atomic Weapons, Weapons
Effects Data," dated 1 July 1959, have an unwanted "ground reflection
factor" of 2 incorporated in the data. See, for example, Figure 3.5ofthismanual.
QTABLE 5. BLAST LOADING OF S/M SKIN
OR ACOUSTIC SHROUDS
E, Ib of TNT R/E l/3 ir/E I/3 Ir, psi-ms
29.26 2.11 88.0 278
21.50 2.34 80.0 222
13.84 2.71 63.0 151
6.40 3.50 49,0 91.0
1.03 6.32 22.1 22.7
C. Loading of Command Module {C/M)
The bursting pressure spheres will apply a blast loading to the
aft heatshield of the Command Module (C/M). The mean distance from
the blast source midway between the two pressure vessels to the aft
heatshield is R = 5.54 ft. Again, the important blast parameter isIr.
Table 6 gives this parameter for the range of energy releases.
E, ib of TNT
TABLE 6. BLAST LOADING OF C/M
R/E1/3 Ir/E 1/3 Ir, psi-ms
29.26 1.80 109.0 335
21.50 1.99 95.0 263
13.84 2.31 78. I 188
6.40 2.98 55.5 103
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V. FRAGMENTATION EFFECTS
Light components of structure or those of large area presented
to the blast wave will be disrupted by the blast wave and accelerated to
some maximum velocity to become missiles which can penetrate or
perforate wails or doors of the building. The sizes and shapes of these
missiles are nearly impossible to predict, except for relatively strong
items joined with weak joints. The velocities can be predicted from the
impulse-momentum theorem which gives
V = I r/m (7)
where m is mass per unit area presented to the blast.
For tests in the SVL, the S/M skin will be so severely loaded as
to be immediately converted into high-speed fragments. Under the
assumption that this light honeycomb structure has a value for m of about
2 X 10 -5 lb sec2/in 3, the resulting velocities are calculated from Eq. (7),
and are listed in Table 7. The shroud around the spacecraft consists of
1/4-in. steel segments, joined by weak wooden vee-joints, which should
fail immediately under the blast loading. Mass per unit area for the
shroud is then
m = 0.283386X0.25 = 1.832 X 10-4 lb sec2/in 3
and velocities for these segments are also given in Table 7.
TABLE 7. VELOCITIES FOR S/M SKiN AND ACOUSTIC SHROUD
V, ft/sec
E, lb of TNT Ir, psi-ms Skin Shroud
29.26 278 1168 126.2
21. 50 222 925 I00.9
13.84 151 629 68.6
6.40 91.0 379 41.4
1.03 22.7 94. 5 12.4
The skin would undoubtedly be fragmented into small pieces, and
the size of these pieces and the manner in which they would strike wails,
doors, etc. is quite indeterminate. No rational estimates of penetration
or perforation effects can be made for the skin fragments.
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A section of the shroud would most probably be projected horizontally,
nearly normal to its surface and would be considerably slowed by air drag
before reaching the wall. But, it is quite possible tha" the segment _ill
rotate and strike thewall either edge-on or end-on; the most critical case
for possible wall penetration being the latter.
A Navy empirical formula for penetration, D, of a slab by fragment
or projectile impact is given in Reference 50 Perforation of thin slabs
occurs for thicknesses of 2Do
D = KAplogl0(1 + v2/215,000) (s)
In this formula
D = depth of penetration in feet;
K = 4o76 X 10 -3 ft3/lb for reinforced concrete,
Ap = sectional pressure, i.e., missile weight divided by impact
area, lb/ft 2, and
V = striking velocity in ft/seco
Assuming that a shroud segment is equal in length to the S/M (156 in.)
we have
Ap -- 0 283 X 156 X 144 = 6360 lb/ft 2
Thickness of slab, which would be perforated 2D in inches, is computed
for each blast source energy and listed in Table 8. Note that no perforation
is predicted for even the greatest energy release,so that there appears
to be no problem for fragments passing through the walls.*
TABLE 8o PERFORATION OF WALL SLAB BY SAL SHROUD
( v2 )
.._v___ft____/...s__ec v 2 1 + 215_000 log 10 ( ) 2D, in.
126.2 15,900 1.0740 0.0309 1.82
100.9 10 150 1.0472 0.0205 1.24
68 6 4, 700 1.0218 0.00946 0. 573
41, 4 I, 7 I0 I, 00795 0. 00345 0. 209
12. 4 153,7 1.000715 0.000310 000187
*Fly speck on paper caused an initial error in the estimation of the distance
2D. This erronous value was the one communicated to NASA personnel at
the meeting attended by the first two authors.
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VI. RESPONSE TO BLAST LOADING
A, Response of PEAF Panels
1. Bending Response
The PEAF panels (P__recast Exposed Aggregate Facing)are
concrete reinforced panels. Those panels closest to the blas'_ source
have dimensions of approximately 111.5 ×396 inches. The panels are
connected to the structural steel frame of the building by means of nine
bolts. The 6-in, thick panel in the SVL is shown in Figure 2. For the
purposes of computing the response of the panel-to-blast loading, the
panel is idealized as a beam, simply supported at both ends and in the
middle (Figure 3a). The response of this beam is desired. Further
simplifications are possible since EI is constant; the lengths of both
sections are equal and the blast source is located almost directly over
the center support. Thus, the response of the beam shown in Figure 3b
must be found. It is assumed that the system is elastic and that deforma-
tions are smalI, l'he response computed under the foregoing assumptions
is conservative in that the actual system is stronger than that analyzed.
For the beam shown in Figure 3b, the response to a time-
dependent pressure is given by the foliowing system of equations (Ref. 6):
w(x, t) = Z qbn(x) (A n cos C0nt + B n sin C0nt )
n=l
t
1 f
mn_n 0 Qn(r) sin [_0n(t - r)]dr]
(9)
kn xan(X) = ch -- - COS -_) - kn x knX )K sh _ sin---_-- (lO)
K
ch k n - cos k n
sh kn - sin k n
(ll)
12
396"
111_5"
---0 0
0 0 0
=_typical
"i " • Q Q • •
//// ///// //
/",/ I nsulation / ///,/////////
_1_ ot
/ Noo3 rods, typical
/ 3/4" DiaoBolt, typical 9 places
/ No. 2 rods,typical
---TI I
Y4"_ Assumed
U Typical
44-33 Wire mesh
(0o124in2 per linear ft)
-- Sameas other slab
Figure 2. Six-Inch Thick PEAFPanel In SVL
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FIG URE 3.
For large n
O Blast Source
I
EI = Const.
Figure 3a
Figure 3b
llll II il_EI = Const. _-x
F
y,w
ASSUMED MODEL FOR PEAF PANEL RESPONSE
k 3 = 10.2102
k4 = 13. 3518
11"
kn = (4n + I) _-
2
X'n E%/_°an -
_2
A n ' f
= -- Wo_@n dx
mn 0
l
Bn _ 1 f XVObt_bn dx
mnUan 0
l
mn=f bt_gn dx
0
14
(12)
Qn(r) : f
0
p(x, t)_n dx (13)
In the foregoing equations,
- length of beam
beam mass per unit length of beam
El bending rigidity of beam
w
-, displacement of beam in y direction
- mode shape
m n - generalized mass
Qn(r) - generalized force
dot (.) - derivative with respect to time
For the case of a blast load given by p(x,t) = Pr e-t/Twhere, for a given
tank pressure, Pr and T are constants (see Table 4}, we have the
following:
Qn(r ) Pr "_ -r/T
- e [(sh kn - sin kn) - K(ch k n + cos kn) + 2K]
kn <, . ..__j
_¢- --
K2
t
I = / Qn('r) sin [COn(t - T)] dr (14)
0
Pr _ K 2
)kn
[I 1 sin COnt - I 2 cos 00nt] (15)
(-' )1_e -t/T _- cos _Ont + _0n sin cot + T
I1 = 1 ' (16)
(1 )e-t/T - Tc°s COnt - _n sin cot + T
[Z = l (17)
T'--:+ °_zn
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For a concrete beam, the computation of El poses a prob-
lem in that it is not possible to calculate an "exact" rigidity. From
Reference 7, we have for the 6-in. thick PEAF panels
E = 1.8 X 106 + 0.5 X I03 f' = 3 X 106 psi
c
I = 1860 in4
El = 5.58 X 109 Ib-in Z
where it has been assumed that the compressive strength of the concrete
in the PEAF panel, f_, is about Z500 psi. Reference 8 presents an
alternate technique for obtaining the rigidity:
E = 3.3 X 104{f_) 5/8 = 4.39 X 106 psi
I = 1142 in4
El = 5. 02 X i06 Ib-in Z
The agreement between the answers is surprisingly good.
The details of the 8-in. thick PEAl?" panels in the SAL
could not be determined because no drawings were readily available.
Assuming that each of the precast slabs composing the PF.AF panel is
the same as the 6-in. thick panel (see Fig. 2) and assuming that the
panels are separated by an additionalZin., we can obtain from
Reference 8
EI = 1 )_ 1010 lb_in Z
and from Reference 7
El = Io 085 X I0 I0 ib-in 2
The value 1 × 1010 lb-in 2 was used in the calculations.
The maximum allowable moment in the beam may be esti-
mated by assuming that the entire moment is obtained from the reinforcing
steel, which is stressed to yield. Thus the bending strength of the beam
attributable to the compressed concrete is ignored. This calculation is
very realistic for the PEAF panels as they are very much under-reinforced,
and the bars yield before the concrete becomes appreciably stressed. For
the 6-ino thick panel, the allowable moment is about
M A = 300,000 in.-lb
16
arid for the 8-in. thick panel
M A = 358,000 in. -ib
To obtain these values, it was assumed that the yield strength ofboth the wire
mesh and reinforcing steel was 33, 000 psi. The net force for the entire
ii 1.5-in. cross section was ZI,800 Ib for the reinforcing steel and
38,000 ib for the mesh. For the 8-in. panel, the compressive and
tensile forces are separated by about 6.25 in. for the mesh and 5.5 in.
for the reiniorcing steel. Multiplying the mesh force by its lever arm
and adding it to the product of the reinforcing steel force and its lever
arm yields the allowable moment listed above.
Once the deflection w(x,t) is found, the shear force, S,
and bending moment, M, may be calculated by differentiation:
El -'" = M
dx
EI --dgw = S
dx Z
At the supports, the shear force is equal to the reactions, and thus the
bolt loads may be obtained. These loads as well as the bending moments
must be below a11owable values or else it is assumed that the panel fails.
The allowable shear stress for a concrete reinforced beam is (l_ef. 7,
p 139)
T
0.03 fc = 75 psi
The shear force in the panel should be much less than that corresponding
to this stress since the panel is not designed as a structural member and
does not have sufficient shear-reinforcing steel.
Equations (9) through (17)were programmed on a computer.
It was found that the moment in the 6-in. thick PEAF panel exceeded
the allowable moment for all cases shown _ Table 4. Thus, it may be
concluded that these panels fail in bending. The 8-in. thick panels sur-
vived only the last case shown in Table 4. That is, for the orte case, the
moment did not exceed the allowable. The bolt loads were within
I000 Ib/bolt, and the shear stresses were much less than allowable
value s.
2. Bolt Loads
It is apparent from the preceding parts of this report that
the expected blast loading on the PEAF panels in the SVL causes the
17
panels to fail in bending, even for 25-.percent pressure, assuming that
the suppo, ling bolts do not fail in tens ion and that the tee-slots by which
these bolts fasten the panels to the framework of the building do not pull
out of the panels. Data from MSC indicate that in the ,.,VL the tee-s!ots
are not attached to the panel reinforcing rods and catx only take a load of
about 1000 lb/bolt without pulling out of the panel, in the SAL, these
slots are welded to the panel reinforcement, and one can assume that the
bolts will probably developtheirfull tensile strengths before failure°
Critical blast pressures can be easily estimated for tee-slot or bolt
failure.
For panels in tLe SVL the maximum allowable load is
that which will pull the nine tee-slots out of the pa_,el, or
F A = 9 × 1000 .: 9000 lb
Panel area is
396 X 111.5 = 4.41 >( 104 in 2
Allowable, statically applied pressure is, therefore,
PA = 90001(4° 41 × 104) = 0.204 psi
Equating this to Pr for the olast loading, we obtain from Reference 4
that R/E 1/3 = 330 since R = 32 ft_ E 1/_ = 0.0970, avd t!2 = 9.11 X 10 _4 lb.
The vessel pressure corresponding to this value of :g is so small as to
be essentially negligible, If we accept the limitation above, then we must
conclude that no pressurization should be allowed in the vessels during
test m the SVLo
For panels in the SAL, the maximum allowable load is that
which will f,il the bolts in tension. A handbook value for allowable load
on a conventional 3/4.ino NC _teel bolt is _3,000 lbo Failure load for a
mild-steel bolt will be somewl-,at higher, _ :rhaps by a factor of 1.5. So,
F A -- 9 X 1.5 X 53,000 = 882,000 lb
Allowable static pressure on a panel is then
PA : 882, 000/(4. 41 × 104) : 20 psi
Again equating this to Pr for blast loading, we get R/F. 1/3 = 9.55. Blast
energy is then E : 37,5 lbo Since this is greater than the maximum pos-
sible blast equivalent for the bursting pressure vessels, we see that bolt
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failure will not occur in the SAL.::= Allowable vessel pressure in the SAL
should then be dictated by panel failure in bending or shear under the
blast loading.
3. Rigid- Body Response
it the bolts holding the PEAF panels in the SVL fail or pull
out of the panels, as is probable, then these panels will be projected
horizont.diy out trom the building and will tall tc the ground or onto the
roof oI the control room adjacent to this laboratoryo Velocities can be
calculated from Eq_ (7), The mass per unit area of the 6-in. PEAF
panels is
396 X 111.5 X 386
= i.5 × 10 .3 lb sec2/in 3
Reflected impulse I r can be obtained from Table 4 for various energy
releases° The resulting velocities from Eq. (7) are given in Table 9.
Each panel falls under the effect of gravity as it is projected so that it
will strike the ground at some distance from its initial position, depen.-
dent on its initial height above the ground° The bottoms of the central
panels, which are most heavily loaded, art., about 45 ft above the ground,
while the panels above the control room roof are initially about 12 ft up.
For initial horizontal projection, the distance projected is
where h is height above ground. These distances are also shown in
Table 9 for panels above the ground and the control room roof_ They
can be seen to be negligible.
TABLE 9o VELOCITIES AND PROJECTION DISTANCES
FOR PEAF PANELS IN THE SVL
Projection Distances, d, ft
E, I r , V,
lb of TNT psi-ms ft/sec Ground
Control Room
Roof
29.26 39,5 2.20 3,69 1,90
21.50 31,9 1.77 2.96 1.53
13,84 23.4 1.30 2,18 1,12
6.40 13.8 0 766 1.28 0. b62
1,03 4.01 0.222 0.372 0,192
:::In this estimate, the dynamics of the panel bolt system is ignored.
stress can be about two tirnes greater than the static stress.
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The dynamic
Co Response of Doors
We were not able to make numerical computations of door response
under blast loading because we could not determine exact construction
details or weights from data available at MSC. But, we believe that the
guideways at the tops would fail as the doors are blast loaded and that the
doors would essentially rotate about their bottom edges and fall outward
without being projected any appreciable distance from the building. This
estimate is based on the calculations of rigid-body response of the PEAF
panels and the assumption that the doors are of somewhat comparable
mass per unit area exposed to the blast.
m. Motion of Command Module and Abort Rocket under Blast
Loading
Under reflected blast loading from the bursting pressure spheres,
the C/M will be impulsively loaded and projected upwards. The mean
distance from the blast source midway between the two pressure vessels
to the aft heatshield of the C/M is R = 5. 54 ft. The important blast
parameter is reflected impulse It. Under this impulse, the module will
have an upward velocity imparted to it which can be calculated from
Eq. (7). The C/M plus appurtenances weighs about 26,000 Ib and has
an area presented to the blast equal to a circle 13 ft in diameter. Then,
mass/unit area is
26,000 4
m = X
386
ITX 132- X 144
= 3.53 X 10 -3 Ib secg/in 3
The upward velocity will cause the C/M to rise against gravity to a height
given by
h = vZ/zg (19)
The blast loading, upward velocity, and height of rise are given for the
four postulated energy releases in Table 10. Even under the most
TABLE I0. RESPONSE OF C/M TO BLAST LOADING
E, It, V,
lb of TNT psi-ms ft/sec h, ft
29.26 335 7.90 0.97
21.50 263 6.20 0.60
13.84 188 4.33 0.29
6.40 I03 2.43 0.092
2O
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severe loading, the C/M can be seen to rise an insignificant amount
before fatling back into the wreckage of the S/Mo
Containment Vessel
it may prove desirable to build a vessel which will completely
contain any explosion which might occur. This structure must necessarily
enclose in an airtight manner the vehicle being tested. To date, only the
response to internal blast of spherical vessels has been determined in a
rigorous manner. Both the loading on the wails and the end closures of
cylindrical containment vessels pose serious problems to the analyst°
}-'or the present facility, it is felt that a cylinder is ideal (geometrically)
and that a caretully designed vessel need not be rigorously_;_ analyzed_
Realistic, approximate solutions are possible.
To see if a cylindrical containment vessel is feasible, assume
that it is fabricated from 60, 000-psi yield steel and has a diameter of
30 ft. The equation of motion for axisymmetric radial motion is]'
_,+ E
w = p(t)2 (zo)
pa
where w is the radial displacement, p the mass density, a the cytindrical
shell radius, E the modulus of elasticity, and p(t) the blast pressure
loading. The solution to this equation for the case of a blast load may
be found in Reference 9. The maximum displacement is given by
f
Pr a2 A2
Wmax - hE "4 + B2 (21)
where A and B are defined in Reference 9. The shell circular frequency is
147= -- = 1 124 X 103 rad/seca
For the maximum tank pressure considered in this report, we have the
following blast properties:
*By this, the authors mean a solution which satisfies the shell equations
of motion, both in the cylindrical portions and end c_'osure portions of the
vessel.
]'To get this equation, add inertia and loading terms to expression for hoop
stress in segment ol circular ring and express stresses in terms of dis-
placements.
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Pr = 114 psi
I r = 91 psi-ms
where lr is the impulse corresponding to the reflected pressure. For an
equivalent impulse, the duration of a triangular blast wave, T, may be
obtained from
Pr T
2 = Ir
and
T= 1.6 nls
Thus ¢o2[ = 1.8, and, from Reference 9
_/A2 + B _ = 0.8
The maximum displacement and stress are
0.8Pra2
W
max hE
0.8Pra w
°-max - h = E6 = E --
a
Assuming that _max is 60,000 psi, shell thickness is
h= 0.27 in.
This is a relatively thin shell, so it is therefore concluded that a cylindrical
containment vessel completely enclosing the vehicle being tested is generally
fe as ible.
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VIIo DISCUSSIONAND RECOMMENDATIONS
Some conclusions can be drawn as a result of this study of explosion)
oi pressure vesseis In the Apollo spacecraft while being tested in the
vtbratmn and acoustic test facility at NASA-MSC. The first conclusion is
that blast effects of such an explosion would be quite severe, resulting in
extensive damage to the building and possible danger to personnel outside
the building from wall panels, doors, etc_, which would be blown out°
This conclusion is not particularly surprising, because the laboratories
were not designed as blast _resistant structures but, instead, were designed
only for dead loads and wind pressure. A second conclusion is that,
alLhough various parts of the spacecraft and surrounding equiprrient would
be disrupted and converted to missiles, it is highly improbable that these
missiles would perforate walls or doors and constitute a hazard to per-
sonnel outside the facility_ However_ failure of the walls may cause
chunks of concrete and other debris to be projected into the immediate
vicinity_ We have also concluded that several conceivable effects of the
explosion are negligible° The C/M and escape tower, located immediately
above the pressure vessels in the S/M, cannot conceivably be projected
any appreciable distance upward and, therefore, cannot impact the roof in
either laboratory. Also, any static pressure rise within either laboratory
from release of the gas in the pressure vessels will be so small as to be
entirely negligible.
Another conclusion appears almost redundant° This conclusion is
that no one should be allowed within either laboratory while the vessels
are under full pressure, or even under any partial pressure in circum-
stances which could lead to catastrophic vessel failure. The events
occurring within the laboratory in event of vessel failure would be so
violent as to render injury or death to persons there almost certain_
The most important recommendation is that no tests be run in
either laboratory with the pressure vessels at or near full pressure. A
second recommendation is that no attempt be made to convert the facilities,
including the control room, to explosion-proof test areas by modifications
such as sandbagging, erection of local barricades within the laboratories,
e_c_. unless NASA is willing to undertake major modifications to the
tactlltles_ The DEAF panels which constitute the outer wails nod the main
doors to each laboratory, are far too weak both as structural members and
tn their attachments to the frame ot the building to be safeguarded by
barricades or sandbags, The roof of the control room also appears _o be
too wear to survive the loads it might expertenceo A possible alternative
to majo_ facility moditication is to surround the spacecraft by a cylindrical
containment vessel within the building. This is shown here to be generally
feasible in an engineering sense but may prove prohibitively expensive or
may seriously mtertere with the tests being conducted m the laborator_es_
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In closing, let us reiterate a basic assumption of this study°
Throughout this report we have assumed that vessel failure would occur
regardless of pressure in the vessel at time of rupture, and we have
studied the effects of such failure. We have no__.!tat empted to ascertain
the probability of a failure nor of less severe failure than con_plete and
instantaneous bursting.
/
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APPENDIX
STATEMENT OF WORK FOR SOUTHWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE
"Study of Explosions in the NASA-MSC Vibration
and Acoustic Test Facility (VATF)"
1°0 General - The MSC Vibration and Acoustic Test Facility (VATt_')
is a facility composed of three (3) laboratories, a control room,
shop, and offices. Two laboratories require special consideration
due to potential explosion hazards; these are l) the Spacecraft
Vibration Laboratory (SVL) and 2) the Spacecraft Acoustic
Laboratory (SAL). Each laboratory is approximately 60' x 60'
wide and 100' high and can accommodate a fully integrated Apollo
Spacecraft for testing. The walls of each laboratory are composed
of precast exposed aggregate panels with reinforcement. The
panels are approximately 10 feet wide by 30 feet long with a 6 inch
thickness in the SVL and an 8 inch thickness in the SAL.
During testing, the Apollo Spacecraft is positioned in the center of
the laboratory so that the distance from the spacecraft centerline
to the nearest wall is approximately 30'
On board the Apollo Spacecraft, there are located pressurized
vessels which have a high damage potential {in the event of an
explosion) to both the spacecraft and the laboratory. The vessels
which appear to offer the most serious problems are the two (g)
helium pressure spheres which are located interior to the Service
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Study of Explosions in the NASA-MSC Vibration
and Acoustic Test Facility (VATF) (continued)
Module. These spheres are made of titanium alloy,
40.2-inch inner diameter, a 0. 366-inch thick shell,
pressurized during test to a nominal 3650 psi.
have a
and are
g.0
Purpose of Study - The purpose of this study is the following:
I) To assess the damage potential of pressurized vessels to
the Spacecraft Vibration Laboratory, the Spacecraft Acoustic
Laboratory and to adjacent areas.
Z) To determine the maximum pressures which can _e used
consistent with present facility design criteria.
3) Te suggest methods for modifying or safeguarding the
facilities _o insure that damage to the structure and operating
personnel will be minimal in the event of an explosion.
3.0 General Guidelines - The following are general guidelines which
can be used for the purposes of this study:
1) The source of the explosion, if one occurred, would be
centered in the middle of each facility at a height of approx-
imately 55 feet from the floor.
Z) In the Spacecraft Vibration Laboratory, the Apollo Spacecraft
will be exposed to the building's interior environment. In
the Spacecraft Acoustic Laboratory the spacecraft will be
Z7
Study of Explosions in the NASA-MSC Vibration
and Acoustic Test Facility (VATF) (continued)
enclosed in an acoustic shroud system- details of which
_rlay be obtained fron_ the V.AT..
4.0 Schedule
a) Quick lool; at present situation and opinion as to hazard from
which safety precautions may be developed by MSC. (100%,
50%, Z5% pressurization).
b) Detailed study and sub.,_ission of a report of recommendations.
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